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of action. For example, in State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer,9
involving the award of a public contract, the statute required that the
board award the contract to the lowest and best bidder. The facts were
undisputed that the relator submitted the lowest and best bid. The board,
in effect, thus admitted that had it exercised its discretion properly it could
have reached but one result. Therefore, instead of issuing mandamus to
compel proper exercise of discretion, the court issued mandamus to compel
the board to award the contract to relator. Again, in State ex rel. McCleary
v. Adcock,1o the statute set up certain requirements as a prerequisite to the
granting of a license. Since it was undisputed that the relator had ful-
filled the requirements, mandamus issued to compel the granting of the
license.
Paradoxically, the rule as to direct control by mandamus when all facts
essential to relator's right are admitted was first enunciated in a case
whose holding contravenes the orthodox application of mandamus. In that
case, State ex rel. Kelleher v. Board, St. Louis Public Schools,11 the statute
provided for the appointment by a school board of judges and clerks for its
elections. No requirements were set out as to the political affiliations of
the appointees, but, because of the danger of a "gross fraud" on the public,
mandamus issued to compel the selection of an equal number of Republicans
and Democrats. The board's discretion, exercised properly under the terms
of the statute, was directly controlled by the court.
The rule, then, seems to be that mandamus will issue (1) to compel
performance of a ministerial duty; 12 (2) to compel exercise of discretion
when there has been a refusal to take action;13 (3) to compel the exercise
of discretion in a proper manner when its exercise has been arbitrary,
capricious, or unlawful;1 4 and (4) to compel a particular result when the
authority in whom discretion is vested admits in effect that, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, there can be but one result.15 Since the instant
case falls into none of these categories, mandamus was properly denied.
N. B. K.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-LIABILITY FOR VIOLATING RETIREDIENT OF
PuLic FiGURE-[Federal] .- Plaintiff was a former child prodigy who had
drawn wide publicity when at the age of eleven he lectured to mathema-
ticians on the fourth dimension and when at the age of sixteen he was
graduated from Harvard. Some thirty years later he was living as un-
obtrusively as possible, working at a petty office job, and rooming in a
boarding house in Boston. Defendant, publisher of The New Yorker maga-
9. (1914) 183 Mo. App. 463, 481, 167 S. W. 1123, 1127.
10. (1907) 206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270.
11. (1896) 134 Mo. 296, 35 S. W. 617.
12. See cases cited supra note 2.
13. See cases cited supra note 5.
14. See cases cited supra note 6.
15. State ex rel. Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer (1914) 183 Mo. App.
463, 481, 167 S. W. 1123, 1127; State ex rel. McCleary v. Adcock (1907)
206 Mo. 550, 105 S. W. 270.
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zine, ferreted him out, and published without his permission an article
entitled "April Fool," sketching his present mode of living. Since the
plaintiff was suing in a federal court on grounds of diversity of citizenship,
he was entitled by the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' to recover
under the law of any state in which publication occurred. Thus the plaintiff
brought suit stating three causes of action: (1) violation of his common
law right of privacy; (2) infringement of the rights afforded him by the
New York Civil Rights Law; 2 and (3) malicious libel.3 The lower court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the first two causes of action and
plaintiff appealed. Held: (1) There was no invasion of plaintiff's common
law right of privacy, because plaintiff was still a subject of public interest;
(2) the statutory action must fail since his name was not used for "trade
purposes" within the meaning of the New York statute. Sidis v. F-R Pub-
lishing Co.,
Since the historic article by Warren and Brandeis,5 there have not been
as many cases on the right of privacy as one might expect. A common law
right of privacy has been recognized by the courts of Georgia,6 Kentucky,7
Kansas,8 and Missouri.0 The courts of California have established a right
of privacy by a questionable interpretation of the state constitution.' 0 On
the other hand, the doctrine has been flatly rejected in Rhode Island" and
Washington. 12 Until the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,"3
the trend in New York was unmistakably toward recognition of the right.14
1. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64.
2. N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Civil Rights Law, art. 5, secs. 50 and
51.
3. This issue was not decided by this court.
4. (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 806.
5. The Right of Privacy (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
6. Pavesich v. New England L. I. Co. (1905) 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68,
69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561; Bazemore v.
Savannah Hospital (1930) 171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194; Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff (1936) 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S. E. 452.
7. Brents v. Morgan (1927) 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967, 55 A. L. R. 964;
Douglas v. Stokes (1912) 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.)
386, 32 Ann. Cas. 374; Foster-Milburn v. Chinn (1909) 134 Ky. 424, 120
S. W. 364, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137, 135 Am. St. Rep. 417; Jones v. Herald
Post Co. (1929) 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972; Rhodes v. Graham (1931)
238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46.
8. Kunz v. Allen (1918) 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532, L. R. A. 1918D 1151.
9. Munden v. Harris (1911) 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076.
10. In Melvin v. Reid (1931) 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91, the court
based the right of privacy on art. I, sec. 1, of the California constitution:
"All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty;
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness." Since many other states have similar constitutional
provisions, this seems to be a strained construction.
11. Henry v. Cherry & Webb (1909) 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97, 24 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 991.
12. Hillman v. Star Publishing Co. (1911) 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594,
35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 595.
13. (1902) 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 89 A. L. R. 828, 59 L. R. A. 478.
14. See Ragland, The Right of Privacy (1929) 17 Ky. L. J. 85.
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One case seemed impliedly to recognize the right, and one year later this
implied recognition ripened into express recognition in the case of Schuyler
v. Curtis.15 But this case was reversed, and the subsequent rejection of the
right in the Roberson-6 case led to the passing of the New York Civil
Rights Law.17 Thus, right of privacy in New York depends entirely on
the courts' interpretation of the statute.
The common law right of privacy has been defined as "the right to live
one's life in seclusion without being subjected to unwarranted and unde-
sired publicity."'8 This definition has been accepted by most of the courts
recognizing the right. However, where one becomes, willingly or not, an
actor in an occurrence of public or general interest, he emerges from his
seclusion, and it is generally recognized that it is not an invasion of his
right of privacy to publish his photograph or to write about him.19 But a
problem arises as to just how long a person in whom there is news value
must remain out of the public eye before his news value dies. A California
case held that a person who had retired from the public eye for seven years
was no longer a subject of public interest. 20 A more recent case in the
same forum held that retirement for one year was enough to preclude the
subject from public speculation. 21 On the other hand, the principal case
found that thirty years of retirement did not end public interest. Here,
however, there is an intimate connection between the past prominence which
made plaintiff "newsworthy" and the present privacy which is alleged to
have been invaded. As the court put it, "His subsequent history, containing
as it did the answer to the question of whether or not he had fulfilled his
-early promise, was still a matter of public concern. ' 22 Interest in the one
contained the seeds of interest in the other. The article, moreover, was
conceived and written in that light. In the California cases23 there was no
such connection. The closed chapter in each life was reopened for its own
sake and without regard to, or thought for, the subsequent pursuits of the
subject.
This distinction suggests that the duration of retirement from the public
gaze is not the determinative factor in cases of this sort. Rather it is the
nature of the former prominence and of the public interest aroused by it to
which the court must look. If the acts of the plaintiff which brought him
to public attention were such as to arouse a continued public interest in the
plaintiff's future, then the defendant will be justified in satisfying that
15. (Sup. Ct. 1893) 24 N. Y. S. 509.
16. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (1902) 171 N. Y. 538, 64
N. E. 442, 89 A. L. R. 828, 59 L. R. A. 478.
17. N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Civil Rights Law, art. 5, sees. 50 and
51.
18. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193.
19. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner (1939) 95 P. (2d) 491.
20. Melvin v. Reid (1931) 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91.
21. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Inc. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 845.
22. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 806, 809.
23. Melvin v. Reid (1931) 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91; Mau v. Rio
Grande Oil Inc. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 845.
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interest at a later date, even if the plaintiff has withdrawn from the public
eye.
J. J. E.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw-LAY PRACTICE BEFORE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION - ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT-
[Missouri].-Plaintiff, a duly authorized and licensed layman practitioner
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, sued the defendant corpora-
tion in Missouri for fees for services rendered under a contract of employ-
ment made in Illinois. By the terms of the contract plaintiff was to
represent defendant on a contingent fee basis in certain rate reduction cases
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Defendant demurred to plain-
tiff's petition, alleging that the contract was contrary to the public policy of
Missouri, since it called for services amounting to the practice of law as
defined by statute in Missouri. The demurrer was sustained and plaintiff
appealed to the supreme court. Held, that the lower court erred in sustain-
ing the demurrer to plaintiff's petition.1 The contract was valid according
to federal law, which was binding on the State of Missouri under the
"supreme law of the land" clause of the Federal Constitution,2 and the
Missouri statute defining and regulating the practice of law does not de-
clare a policy against any right accorded by federal law. De Pass V. Harris
Wool Co. 3
The Missouri statute defines the practice of law as, inter alia, "the
appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity * * * before * * *
any body, board, committee or commission constituted by law or having
authority to settle controversies * * *.,,4 Thus in Missouri only a licensed
lawyer can appear and practice before an administrative agency. The
Supreme Court of Missouri has held, for example, that this statute, as a
valid exercise of the police power, confines the practice of law before the
State Public Service Commission to duly licensed attorneys. 5 Plaintiff,
therefore, could not have entered into a valid contract to appear as an
advocate before any state agency.6
With the rapid growth of administrative agencies in recent years, prac-
tice before state and federal agencies has been much discussed by legal
writers.7 There is no uniformity among the forty-eight states as to the
rights of laymen to appear before the various state agencies.8 There is
1. Defendant thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri en
bane.
2. Art. 6, cl. 2.
3. (Mo. 1940) Div. 1, May Term, No. 36,559 (unpublished).
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 11692.
5. Clark v. Austin (1937) 340 Mo. 467, 101 S. W. (2d) 977.
6. See Howard, Control of Unauthorized Practice Before Administrative
Tribunals in Missouri (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 313.
7. See Gambrell, Lay Encroachment on the Legal Profession (1931)
29 Mich. L. Rev. 989; Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and
Lay Agencies (1931) 41 Yale L. Rev. 69; Howard, supra note 6.
8. In response to questionnaires sent to the attorney generals of the
forty-eight states by Professor Ralph Fuchs of Washington University Law
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